Before the war, Europe was on a great path with recovery underway, controlled inflation, and low unemployment. The war created a situation of increased fragmentation and one of the largest global energy shocks ever seen.

Let me take you back to February 27th. Europe was really on a great path and was well positioned. So we had recovery underway. We're going to increase our projection. most likely. inflation had been under control. oscillating around our 2% target for almost a year. and unemployment was at rock bottom.

The direct impact on GDP is being measured, with IMF, World Bank, and OECD revising projections downward by about -0.3%. The ECB has revised its inflation forecast to 2.6% and growth to 0.9%.

Central bankers must define a baseline and work on scenarios factoring in how high oil/gas prices will be, how long it will last, and the speed of recovery. We are currently somewhere between the baseline and the adverse scenario.

We have to work on scenarios. factoring in how high Oil and Guas and all six of the Nians. derivatives of those products will be. How long it will last? and how Fast the situation will be recovered.

Monetary policy must be completely agile, ready to move, and data-dependent. It does not predicate a direction or rate path today.

What it means for monetary policy is that we have to be... It means two things. We have to be. Completely adjoin. and ready to. move in the direction that is required. And second we have to be data dependent.

No, we have a compass which indicates price stability predicated on financial stability. I wouldn't call them bias.

The 2022 shock was vastly different (inflation, rates, supply/demand combo). Europe was affected more significantly then due to the sudden stop of Russian gas.

We've said clearly we need data to act, but we would not hesitate to act. We must analyze if the shock is short-lived (see-through), long-lasting (requiring action), or in-between (requiring judgment on secondary effects).

I don't have a gut feeling. We decide what we have to do. The 'see-through' story is not something you can explain to fishermen or households facing rising fuel prices.

to explain to the fishermen who cannot go at sea because he cannot pay for his petrol. or when I think of the household that doesn't know whether they'll be able to pay for the refilling of the fuel tank.

The worst case scenario is war. In strict economic terms, it's the Strait of Hormuz not being open for shipping (20% of gas), disrupting goods, fertilizers, and microchips.

We have forecasts for inflation between 2.6% (baseline) and a little north of 4%. We will adjust because we will be agile, but we will keep our 2% target.

It's the whole dilemma of short term vs medium term. The more anxious economic actors are about the crisis resolution, the more pressure on the spot market.

For shipping to resume normal conditions: 2-3 months. For refinery facilities (e.g., in Qatar, Saudi): some require years of repair and adjustment.

When you look at the Rafael Samp refinery facility in Qatar, they say that it's not months, it's years, that we're talking about.

There's a dichotomy. Some assume business as usual, while others warn it's a very significant shock with ramifications for food prices and supply chains, creating disruption between normal and COVID levels.

I always worry about financial stability and price stability because they are intrinsically linked. Supervisors must be attentive to declared and rampant risks (black swans).

The impact of AI on economies and societies: productivity, unemployment, retraining costs, fiscal equilibrium. It's moving fast, can be disruptive, and lacks a governance framework.

What impact will it have on just not just on productivity... But what impact will it have on our societies? How many people will be unemployed? How many people will require retraining, risk-killing, who will pay for that?