Lists major post-conflict constraints: 1) Significant refinery damage affecting product flows (especially jet fuel/diesel), 2) Old oil fields shut down to contain storage overflow, 3) Pipeline damage, 4) Major logistical knot of vessels needing reshuffling to restore flows.

Notes that only 5% of seaborne gasoline flows through Hormuz, making it the least important product affected, unlike jet fuel and diesel.

Europe's jet fuel cushion is about 5 weeks. Time is of essence to restore flows before peak summer demand. Flight cancellations are already occurring and will grow.

Emphasizes reliance on Iranian and Saudi refining toolkits. Peak demand season in 5-6 weeks (June) will complicate the situation.

Jet fuel specifications are globally uniform, creating a worldwide challenge. Flights might depart from long-product regions like North America but returning could be problematic. Gasoline has more flexibility (butane blending, spec relaxation) and he is more bearish on it post-summer.

Contrasts the inflexible global jet fuel market with the more regionally adaptable gasoline market.

Conflict is far from over; peace negotiations are complex and time-consuming (JCPOA took 20 months). Even with a resolution, restoring the last 10-15% of Hormuz flows (2-3 million bpd) could take 6+ months, keeping the market short and prices high into year-end.

Cites low weekend vessel traffic (20 on Saturday) as evidence flows are not moving. Argues the market will miss a 'fair amount of energy for the foreseeable future'.

Russian flows provide a 'fair amount of cushion' but are also at risk from military strikes on export facilities. Energy assets have become central targets in conflict, making supply forecasting difficult.

Acknowledges Russia's size (2nd/3rd largest producer, 2nd largest product exporter) but highlights vulnerability of ports in Baltic and Black Sea.